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Abstract 
The social impacts of Indonesia’s crisis, while serious, have fortunately been  less  
dramatic  than  early  reports  suggested.    Rather  than  the  universal devastation in 
poverty, employment, education  and health so widely predicted and repeated in the media, 
new data reporting on conditions as of  the fall of 1998 reveal a more complex and 
heterogeneous picture.  Not surprisingly, given the genesis of the financial and economic 
crisis in the formal sector, people in urban areas hurting more than rural areas.  People on 
Java appear to have been more effected and are bearing the brunt of the crisis, both in 
comparison to more isolated islands with less linkage  to the formal, modern economy 
(Maluku) or islands with export commodities (large parts of Sulawesi, Sumatra). The new 
data also show that pre-crisis economic status or poverty rates are not good indicators of 
how much any given region or household has been affected by the crisis.  While some of 
the poor are doing worse, others appear to be better off and many of the newly emergent 
urban middle classes are hit the worst of all.  There are however hard hit areas in 
Kalimantan and the Eastern Islands which were both poor pre-crisis and which have been 
hit very hard by the crisis.  These new data have important implications for policy makers 
in designing and adjusting programs aimed at minimizing the affects of the crisis on the 
poor and vulnerable.  
  
                                                     
* This is not a World Bank report and has not received World Bank review nor approval.  Circulation 
in this preliminary form is intended to disseminate the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
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Social Impacts of the Crisis: New Data and Policy Implications1 
Jessica Poppele  (EACIQ), Sudarno Sumarto (SMERU) and Lant Pritchett (EACIF).  
Introduction  
Expenditure changes and poverty impact.  This paper looks first at new data sources on changes 
over the last year in expenditures and asset ownership and  asset sales as proxies for income 
changes due to the crisis.  These data dispel the notion that half of Indonesia’s  population  will  
slip  below  the  poverty  line (predictions  which  were analytically  unsound  in  any  case).    
Instead  the  new  data  show  large  falls  in expenditures, but that the falls have varied 
enormously between urban and rural, across regions of Indonesia and across households 
between rich and poor.  
Sectors. Next this paper discusses the three areas targeted by the government in its social impact 
mitigation programs:  
 employment creation and income maintenance,  
 education, and  
 health  
Within these areas, this paper revisits the original forecasts  -- the scope of the problem as it 
had been understood -- in light of new data noting possible policy and program design 
implications.  Comparison of the impacts between rich and poor, urban and rural and across 
regions of Indonesia paints a more complex and varied picture of crisis impacts across the 
archipelago.  There is a serious crisis to be addressed, but addressing the crisis requires that the 
responses be tailored to the actual dimensions and pattern of the crisis.  
I. New data on the crisis 
Because of the collaborative efforts of many individuals, government, donor agencies and 
foundations interested in mitigating the social impacts of the crisis there are a number of new 
sources of data which will tell us more about the crisis.  This note relies principally on new data 
primarily from three sources, all of which are able to compare outcomes in roughly August-
September 1998 versus a year earlier.  
• The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS),an ongoing longitudinal household and 
community survey, is a collaborative effort of RAND, Lembaga Demografi-UI, and UCLA.    
The  IFLS  results  presented  below  are  drawn  from  two  publications: "Health, Family 
Planning and Well-being in Indonesia During an Economic Crisis" by Frankenberg, 
Beegle, Sikoki, and Thomas (1998) and "Measuring Change in Household Welfare 
During a Crisis: Early Results from the Indonesian Family Life Surveys," by Beegle, 
Frankenberg, and Thomas (1999). Both are available from RAND, Santa Monica at 
http://www.rand.org.  The papers are based on data that were collected in Aug-Dec, 
                                                     
1 This is not a World Bank report and has not received World Bank review nor approval.  Circulation 
in this preliminary form is intended to disseminate the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas, even if the work is less than fully polished.  The paper carries the names of the 
authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in 
this paper are entirely those of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent the view of the World 
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represent the views of those governments or organizations which provide support to SMERU 
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1997, (as part of IFLS2) and Aug-Dec, 1998 (as part of IFLS2+) with funding from NIH, 
USAID, The World Bank, WHO, and UNFPA.  
 The “100 Villages” Survey, sponsored by UNICEF and carried out by BPS (Central 
Bureau of  Statistics),  gives data from re-interviewing households in August 1998  that 
were previously surveyed in July 1997; and  
 The Kecamatan  Crisis Impact  Survey, a qualitative survey of expert respondents 
from each of the roughly 4,000 kecamatan (sub-districts) in the country financed by 
Ford foundation and ASEM and carried out by BPS.  
Where relevant these sources are compared with information from the government's period 
national expenditure survey, the National Socio-Economic Survey (SUSENAS) which was 
carried out in February 1998.  
The timing of the surveys is important, as the crisis has played out in several stages. 
Essentially the crisis did not begin until August of 1997 when the exchange rate was first 
floated.  Things deteriorated steadily, followed by an enormous crash in the exchange 
rate in January of 1998, after which things stabilized somewhat, only to be followed by the 
political crisis of May after which the exchange rate and stock market deteriorated again and 
prices continued to rise rapidly.  Finally, there was a rapid run-up of the price of rice just 
before and during the period of independence day (August 17th).  After September of 1998 
the macroeconomic aggregates have stabilized, again,  with  rice  prices  declining  from  
their  late  August  peaks,  consumer  price inflation slowing to almost nothing and the 
exchange rate remaining fairly stable.  
This timing implies several things about the data.  First,  the data is well timed 
capturing pre-crisis to post crisis (temporary) nadir.  Second, the data may well have been 
influenced by the sharp temporary spike in rice prices (the price of medium quality rice 
in Jakarta rose from 2500 Rp/kg at the beginning of August to 3500 by first week of 
September, but then fell back to less that 3000 by the first week of October).  Third,  
while the “crisis” was a year old in August 1998 as a financial crisis it is almost certain that 
many of the “real” effects are only beginning to be seen has firms and households respond 
to the changes.  So the evolution of the social impacts will likely trace out a more delayed 
and lagged response relative to a quickly moving financial indicator like the exchange rate.  
The IFLS2+ is a resurvey of almost 2,000 households in seven provinces that were part 
of the broader IFLS project.  The seven provinces were purposively selected so that they 
span the full spectrum of socio-economic status and economic activity under the fuller 
IFLS sample which were representative of about 83  percent  of Indonesia’s population.  
The household-level data collected in both IFLS2 and IFLS2+ include expenditures, 
assets,  income  and  details  of  current  work  status  of  each  household  member; 
education enrollments, expenditures and school attendance; use of health care and family 
planning including prices and choice of provider; indicators of health status (both self-
reported and measured by a trained health worker); migration; transfers among family 
members and transfers to and from community programs including such programs as the 
Padat Karya, school scholarship programs and the Kartu Sehat. Extensive  data  on  prices,  
service  availability  and  quality  are  collected  at  the community level, both from 
knowledgeable informants and through visits to schools and health facilities. 
In contrast with the 100 Villages survey (below), the IFLS follows households and individuals 
who move from the location where they were interviewed in earlier rounds. IFLS2+ re-
interviewed over 98% of the households (and over 96% of the individuals) that were 
interviewed in 1997.  Sample attrition is not a serious concern in the IFLS 2+ data.  
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As noted by the authors of the IFLS publications that we are drawing from, all results are very 
preliminary and subject to change as the data and tabulations are still being verified and revised.  
Also None of the results are weighted to take account of purposive sampling differences. For 
more detail, and additional results, please see the IFLS publications cited above.  
100 Villages.  The 100 villages survey re-surveyed 120 people in each of 100 villages in 1998.  
The 100 villages are not statistically representative of the country, but were chosen as 
representative” of various parts of the country.  The data cover only 10 of the country’s over 300 
kabupaten.  In the 1998 sample 80 households from the 120 interviewed in 1997 were re-
interviewed while 40 new HH were selected and added to keep the sample size at 120
2
.  Here 
we use comparisons of village averages only.  The data include information on expenditures, 
asset ownership, education enrollment, health status, and other indicators.  The survey is part of 
a larger exercise that means to integrate quantitative and qualitative indicators tracked over time 
to provide a more dynamic and integrated picture of poverty.  
The results reported are from the preliminary tabulations of the BPS and analysis by UNICEF of 
the data in a draft titled “Rapid Appraisal” dated 12/4/98.  
The nationwide Kecamatan  Crisis Impact Survey was a subjective, expert respondent survey 
of three government officials in each of Indonesia’s 4025 kecamatans.  In each sub-district three 
respondents with kecamatan-wide responsibilities were chosen and asked a standard set of 
questions about changes taking place in the kecamatan.   The questions asked about the degree 
of different kinds of impacts (migration, access to health and education, food availability, etc.), 
the frequency of different types of coping strategies, and the most severe impacts in each area.  
All questions were designed to measure proportional change in indicators relative to the same 
time in 1997, to eliminate seasonal changes.  
National coverage was necessary in order to identify crisis-hit areas for program targeting.  By 
asking for qualitative assessments the survey designers hoped to get universal coverage with 
complete response (the use of quantitative questions did dramatically raise the non-response rate 
in this survey). Using expert respondents eliminated the problem of large unmanageable sample 
sizes and allowed for rapid response, but raised the concern of  inter-respondent reliability.  
Simply put, would two people who were asked the same question about the same kecamatan 
tend to give the same answer? Three cross-referencing approaches showed an acceptable degree 
of consistency in response patterns within kecamatan but also showed significant level of 
disagreement between respondents.  This and other limitations imply that, while the broad 
patterns -- at the provincial and district level -- indicated by this data are useful  in  targeting  of  
crisis  response,  used  on  their  own,  these  data  would  be insufficient to target programs at 
the kecamatan level.  
The tables and graphs are taken from a document, "The Social Impact of the Crisis In Indonesia:  
Results From a Nationwide Kecamatan Survey", December, 1998 draft.  
The SUSENAS, which contains a core, but short consumption schedule, is carried out every 
year.  Once every three years, the survey contains a separate and detailed consumption module, 
and this is the one used for poverty estimation.  The last year for which such detailed poverty 
statistics are available is 1996.  The next official estimates are due based on data collected in 
                                                     
2 Unfortunately when one of the HH chosen for re-interviewing was not available (because they had 
moved or the HH has broken up) a new HH was chosen randomly from the 40 previously not 
selected from the previous year’s HH and added to the “re-interview” group. This means that the 
sample in 1998 suffers from attrition bias as the 80 re-interviewed HH are no a random sample, but 
are a sample of those who could be re-interviewed. 
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February 1999 with poverty estimates based on an accelerated processing of a sub-sample of 
10,000 available by June.  
II. The impact of the crisis on expenditures, assets, and poverty 
A. Forecasts 
To date the government and various international agencies have predicted extreme and nation-
wide impacts from the crisis.  As expectations worsened from January 1998 through the chaos 
of May and into June people were caught up in a vicious cycle of doom saying in which the only 
news could be that the news was even worse.  
The estimated level of absolute poverty prior to the crisis was around 11 percent, since the 
population is near 200 million, around 22 million people
3
.  In February initial estimates by the 
World Bank were that poverty would increase to around 17 percent, or 34 million people.  Then 
others suggested poverty would reach 50 million people.  In June The BPS reported that the 
percentage of people living below the poverty line in mid-1998 was around 40 percent or about 
80 million people: an increase in the poverty rate of almost 30 percentage points in a year!  Not 
to be outdone, more recently, the figure has been inflated in one report estimating that by the 
end of 1998, almost half the population, or 100 million Indonesians would be living below the 
poverty line.  
The higher figures of 40 percent of the population in poverty produced by BPS and repeated by 
others (e.g. ILO) were known as soon as they were published to be analytically unsound.  It was 
premised on a confusion of real and nominal incomes (which implied real income losses on the 
order of 80-90 percent).  It was based on the unrealistic assumption that in 1998 people’s 
nominal incomes would remain fixed while prices increased by 80 percent
4
.  
Getting some sense of the increase in poverty is important for policymaking as if it really were 
the case that half the Indonesian population were in absolute poverty then this calls for massive, 
universal programs and very little attention to targeting, either regionally or by household.  Just 
by simple arithmetic, if half the population were poor the a rupiah’s worth of benefits distributed 
uniformly would be received by a poor household half the time.  This is about as good a ratio of 
total cost to benefits received by the poor as any targeted program achieves. 
The new data suggest that the dire forecasts are wrong, and by a lot, not a little, for three 
reasons.  First,  the typical magnitude of the decline in expenditures is not any where near as 
large as the 80 percent fall in real income implied by the combination of 80 percent inflation and 
stagnant nominal incomes.  Second, the crisis has tended to hit urban areas, which has higher 
incomes and hence a given income shock has less influence on poverty rates.  Third,  there is 
some evidence the crisis has hit more affluent individuals proportionately harder than the 
absolute poor.  
                                                     
3 This was of course based on a very strict definition of absolute poverty and obviously a higher level 
of expenditures to define the poverty line would have produced a greater number of people in 
poverty.  However, no serious scholar disputes that whatever the line, there had been enormous 
progress in poverty reduction from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s.  Moreover, in discussing poverty 
increases one needs to use a consistent definition for “before” and “after.” 
4 While the BPS has subsequently changed its methodology, this is layed out most clearly in Annex A 
to the ILO's June  1998 report "Employment Challenges  Of the Indonesian Economic Crisis".  The 
assumption that prices would rise 80 percent while nominal incomes were on average unchanged, 
assumes an economy of all buyers and no sellers. 
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As with any important and complex issue, while it is easy to point out what is false, the truth is 
more subtle.  While Indonesia is suffering a severe crisis, it is not the universal disaster that 
some would have it.  There are large differences in how the crisis has effected urban and rural 
areas, in how it has effected different regions and how it has effected the rich and poor.  
B. The Urban Crisis 
Overall, the crisis has a strong urban bias where the depreciated rupiah, corporate debt, illiquid 
banks, exorbitant interest rates, exit of foreign investment and lack of trade finance, have to a 
large extent paralyzed the formal economy.  
IFLS 2+.  The preliminary data from the IFLS 2+ household survey in seven provinces shows 
that average per capita household expenditure had decreased by 24 percent (Table 1).  
The average spending in urban areas fell by a shocking 34 percent with the median falling by 5 
percent. In contrast, rural expenditures fell by much less, in both mean and median,  have risen, 
with mean expenditure falling 13 percent but median expenditures falling by only 1.6 percent. 
Table 1 Household Per Capita Expenditures:  1997, 1998 & Changes real (1997) rupiahs per 
month (‘000) 
 
Mean 1997 
Change in 1998 Percent Change 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Urban 319 -108 -7 -33.90% -5.00% 
Rural 194 -26 -2 -13.40% -1.60% 
All respondents 246 -60 -2 -24.40% -1.50% 
Source: IFLS2+, Table 2.1  
We should raise here, in the first time we use the expenditures data that there is the very serious 
problem of the use of expenditure data as a proxy for incomes.  It has become standard practice 
to use consumption expenditures as a proxy for incomes for reasons both practical and 
theoretical.  Practically, it is just impossible to measure incomes.  Theoretically, one can make 
the argument that since households will use saving and borrowing to smooth expenditures over 
time that expenditures measured over a short period is a better proxy for a household’s long-run 
income and economic status than is measured income.  
However, this same reason suggests that expenditure changes should be used only with great 
caution as an indicator for changes in welfare or income shocks due to the crisis.  Someone very 
near “subsistence” level income may well sell assets or work more  or  undertake  any  
expedient— even  ones  that  lower  long-run  prospects--to maintain  expenditures  out  of  
sheer  necessity.    In  contrast,  sudden  changes  in expectations about the future could occasion 
large changes in expenditure patterns among the better off, even if the actual income changes 
were not large. 
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Table 2 Fraction of Kecamatan in each area (province, urban,  rural)  reporting “people  selling  
assets  to  meet basic  needs”  as  a  coping  mechanism  was  “worse”  (of severity 1,2 or 3) 
 
Total Urban Rural 
DI Aceh 65.6 93.3 62 
North Sumatra 49.2 68.6 43.8 
West Sumatra 52.7 75 43.9 
Riau 37.2 61.1 30.9 
Jambi 32.2 53.9 25.5 
South Sumatra 28.4 50 26.6 
Bengkulu 25.8 57.1 16.7 
Lampung 43.9 75 36.3 
Average 41.9 66.8 35.7 
    
Jakarta 88.4 88.4 
 
West Java 83.2 87.5 82.5 
Central Java 73.8 81.6 72.4 
DI Yogya 65.4 84.2 59 
East Jawa 76.7 86 75.4 
Average 77.5 85.5 72.3 
    
Bali 56.9 66.6 53.9 
NTB 72.1 77.8 71.2 
NTT 54 73.3 51.4 
East Timor (Timtim) 40.3 46.2 38.7 
West Kalimantan 33.6 100 26.7 
Central Kalimantan 55.2 87.5 50 
South Kalimantan 70.2 84.6 68.4 
East Kalimantan 71.4 85.7 66.6 
Average 56.7 77.7 53.4 
    
North Sulawesi 28 35.3 26.4 
Central Sulawesi 29 44.4 26.6 
South Sulawesi 38.6 58.9 33.1 
Southeast Sulawesi 51.6 55.5 51 
Maluku 30 42.9 26.1 
Average 35.4 47.4 32.6 
Source:  Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey,  Table 2 
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Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey.  The kecamatan survey supports the finding that urban areas 
have in general taken a harder hit than rural areas.  Comparing the 40 percent hardest hit 
provinces with the 40 percent least hit provinces reveals clearly that urban areas are, on average, 
much harder hit than rural areas. Of the 20 hardest hit areas, 14 are urban, while of the 20 least 
hit areas, 13 are rural.  Table 2 shows the proportion of kecamatan in each provincial area 
reporting that the fraction of people “selling assets to meet basic needs” was “worse.”  Within 
nearly every province and each region or island this was consistently higher for urban than rural 
areas.  In many cases the differences were dramatic, with only 17 percent in rural Bengkulu 
reporting that, by this indicator, things were worse, versus 57 percent in urban areas, or 33 
percent “worse” in rural South Sulawesi versus 59 percent “worse” in urban areas in the same 
province. 
This urban nature of the crisis makes eminent sense given the propagation of the crisis through 
an exchange rate crisis driven collapse in the banking and financial sectors affecting particular 
large corporations  which were heavily involved in external borrowing.  
C. Regional Dimensions 
Looking nationwide, however, regional patterns reveal an even more complicated picture; the 
kind of picture one would expect in a country as large and economically diverse as Indonesia.  
While urban areas are generally harder hit than their rural neighbors in the same area, some rural 
areas have also been severely affected. Also, some of the eastern provinces in both urban and 
rural areas have experienced substantial negative impact. This distinct regional heterogeneity of 
crisis impacts with some areas suffering enormously, other areas booming and several 
gradations in between.  
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey.  The kecamatan crisis impact survey is the only data set that 
has national coverage.  Examining a set of tables and maps on the regional distribution of the 
crisis suggests three prominent patterns.  
• Java is hard hit, even in rural areas,  
• Some of the other islands, particularly large parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Maluku, have 
experienced minimal negative crisis impact and areas that escaped the drought may actually 
be booming from export crop earnings (due to the currency depreciation);  
• Other  areas  show  negative  impact,  but  it  is  unclear  whether  problems  are economic 
crisis-related or result from drought (East Timor, NTT, NTB) and fires (East Kalimantan).  
The kecamatan survey results place all areas of Java in the 20 hardest hit areas, regardless of 
urban/rural status.  The only other rural areas included in the 20 most affected areas are East 
Kalimantan and Aceh.  The urban areas that fall into the least hard hit 40 percent are those in 
provinces where rural areas are also relatively unaffected, such as Jambi, South Sumatra, Bali, 
North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and Bengkulu.  
One key indicator of impact in the kecamatan survey was the number of households selling 
assets to cope with the crisis.  On the island of Sumatra 65 percent of rural kecamatans reported 
that by this indicator conditions were the same or better than last year.  That is, people were not 
resorting to asset sales to cope with the crisis. On Sulawesi 70 percent of rural kecamatans 
reported things were the same or better.  In contrast 72 percent of  rural kecamatans on Java 
reported on the basis of emergency assets sales, that people were worse off, and 53 percent those 
in NTT, NTB and Kalimantan also reported “worse.”  (See Table 2 above.) 
Figure 1 shows the map at the tingkat II level showing the distribution across the 
country of a “coping” index which is based on indicators of the degree to which people were  
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selling  assets  to  meet  their  basic  needs,  reducing  their  participation  and 
contributions  to  social  activities,  and  other  indicators  of  the  use  of “coping” 
mechanisms.  What emerges very strongly is a regional pattern in which Java is hard hit.  
Also on these maps the cities stand out as the kotamadya are small black dots.  
100 villages.  Data from the 100 villages survey implies similar regional discrepancies by 
comparing changes in assets form 1997 to 1998.  We constructed an index of asset 
ownership based on 10 durable goods (e.g. radio, bicycle) weighted by the relative prices 
of the goods.  It appears that there have not been massive sales of assets to cover 
expenditures, but rather small increases in assets.  Moreover, the increase in asset  
acquisition  is  increasing  with  largest  increases  in  the  western  islands  as compared 
to Java, and the Eastern islands holding about even.  This is consistent with the patterns 
above.  
The  expenditure  data  show  a  similar  regional  pattern  (without  deflation  it  is 
impossible to say anything about levels).  Expenditures have increased more in the parts 
of Sumatra in this sample (Riau and Lampung) than in either the villages surveyed on 
Java Bali or the Eastern islands (note that all the islands in the sample are those that are 
“hard hit” among the off Java islands in table 2).  
Table 3 A weighted asset ownership index: 1997, 1998 and Changes, and nominal expenditure 
increases (undeflated) 
  
1997 1998 Changes 
Percentage change in nominal 
expenditures 
Java-Bali 3.68 5.42 1.74 53.49% 
Off Java Islands - West 4.27 9.42 5.15 89.38% 
Off Java-  East 7.62 7.65 0.03 51.00% 
Off Java-West: Riau, Lampung,  
Off Java-East: East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), East Kalimantan, SE Sulawesi  
Source: 100 villages survey, Table 13 
While it is impossible to say precisely, there are obvious conjectures about the causes behind 
the regional pattern of the crisis, depending on the origin of the crisis.  
First,  since the crisis began as an exchange rate crisis with fed into a financial crisis 
affecting primarily firms that had either some debts denominated in dollars or which relied 
heavily on imports or firms which had links with the formal banking sectors.  It makes sense 
that areas more closely tied up with the urban formal economy have been harder hit that 
those areas which were not as tightly integrated.  
Second, those areas which either had export crops or which were export earners should 
be expected to do well, as the depreciation helped them enormously.  This, combined with 
several reforms (e.g. clove marketing) that put more the benefit in the hands of farmers 
should mean that some rural areas— that are not drought affected and are not primarily 
rice producing (where, at least until August 1998 prices were kept down) benefited 
enormously.  
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Third,  some areas had natural disasters from which they have yet to fully recover. The 
drought of 1997/98 was not as bad as had been feared on Java, but did hit the Eastern 
Islands hard, as well as other scattered parts (west coast of Sumatra, parts of Sulawesi).  In 
addition the drought interacted with the fires in East Kalimantan to produce an eco-
disaster.  
One extremely important aspect of the crisis is that it does not appear to have hit the poor 
areas disproportionately, but hit some well off areas hard and some poor areas hard, and 
vice versa.  In fact, a simple correlation test between various indices and pre-crisis levels 
of  the incidence of poverty based on SUSENAS 1993-1996 across  
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kecamatans reveals very little correlation, statistically insignificant even with 3,900 
observations.  
The same lack of association between pre-crisis poverty and the magnitude of the crisis 
impact can be seen by comparing the figures which show changes (Figure 1, showing the 
index of “coping”) due to the crisis to the pre-crisis poverty levels (Figure 2).  Table 4 gives 
examples of the various types.  While most of West Java, and especially the area 
around Jakarta, have very low poverty rates, the crisis has been enormous in those areas.  
In contrast, Maluku, with very high poverty rates, has perhaps even benefited from the 
crisis. 
Table 4 Examples of differential impact of crisis 
  Relatively well-off pre-crisis Relatively poor pre-crisis 
Hard-Hit Jabotabek, West Java NTT, East Kalimantan 
Not Hard Hit Central Sulawesi, Bali Maluku, Jambi 
Source: Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey, Table 3 
The implications of all of this for policy are discussed in section E.  
D. For Richer and Poorer 
IFLS 2+.  In additional to the regional dimensions of the impact of the shock, the IFLS 2+ also 
gives some indication that even within provinces or within urban areas the shock may not have 
hit the poor the worst, at least in proportionate terms.  While it is true that the poor suffer more 
from a reduction in income because they are starting with so much less, yet there are some 
indications that this crisis has hit individuals who were better off harder in proportional terms.  
Within those regions where the financial and corporate modern sector were hardest hit, Jakarta 
and West Java, there is an interesting story emerging from preliminary household data.  Average 
real per capita household expenditures fell by 30 percent in Jakarta and 42 percent in West Java, 
which are truly terrifying falls.  In contrast median expenditures fell by only one or two  percent 
in Jakarta and fell by six percent in West Java.  In Central Java where average expenditures fell 
by 19  percent, median expenditures has remained stable. This indicates that relatively richer 
households have experienced the most significant declines in per capita household expenditure
5
. 
                                                     
5 This difference in the mean versus the median expenditure is a technical point about statistics of 
central tendency in an asymmetric distribution but conveys an important point and is worth 
explaining with a simple example.  Suppose there were an economy of 10 people, 9 of whom made 
one dollar and 1 of whom made 91 dollars.  Average income is 10 dollars even though 9 of 10 make 
much less and the typical or median income is only 1 dollar.  Now suppose the income of the rich 
person fell to 41 dollars, average income has fallen in half to 5 dollars per person, but 9 out of ten 
people’s income is unchanged and median income is still 1 dollar 
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This means that the regional pattern is mainly apparent in the mean, not the median 
expenditures.  It is not the case that by the change in the median income Jakarta and West 
Java are particularly hard hit, rather  then are  the typical.  Who was hit hard then were 
those in Jakarta and West Java whose expenditures before the crisis were well above the 
provincial average.  
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Table 5 Household Per Capita Expenditures:  1997, 1998 & Changes In real 1997 rupiah '000 
per month 
Province Mean 1997 
Change in 1998 Percent Change 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Jakarta 385 -115 -6 -29.90% -3.40% 
West Java 366 -154 -10 -42.10% -5.90% 
Central Java 234 -45 0 -19.20% 0.00% 
S.  Kalimantan 217 -47 -27 -21.70% -17.20% 
S Sumatra 187 -18 12 -9.60% 11.30% 
North Sumatra 183 -18 -14 -9.80% -10.90% 
NTB 173 -23 -7 -12.70% -6.50% 
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.3 
The same tendency for the shock to have affected those that began better off is 
evident in the data on change in expenditure level by education of the head of the 
household shown in table 6.  Naturally the expenditure levels of those with higher levels 
of education were higher in 1997.  However,  expenditures decreased 14 percent in mean and 
rose 14 percent in median for those with no education.  In contrast, median incomes for 
each of the other groups either rose slightly or fell, which mean income fell by over 20 
percent for each of the more educated groups. \ 
Table 6 Changes in mean and median per capita HH expenditures by level of education of the 
head of HH. 
Level of 
Schooling 
  
Mean HH monthly 
expenditures per capita 
(‘000 rupiah) in 1997 
Percentage change 
in the mean of 
median of expenditures 
Percentage 
change in the 
median of expenditures 
None 201 -14.43% 14.02% 
Elementary 214 -26.64% -1.69% 
Secondary 267 -29.59% -4.08% 
Tertiary 357 -22.97% 1.66% 
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.5 
This same effect is seen by examining the change in income of households to see to what 
extent those in the bottom part of the distribution remained there.  Table 7 shows the 
distribution of expenditures per capita.  Those that were measured to be in the bottom 
quartile of the expenditure distribution in 1997 saw an enormous increase in their measured 
expenditures in 1998.  Similarly those in the top quartiles saw enormous declines.  This 
likely reflects three factors.  
The first is regression to the mean due to measurement error.  In even the best 
surveys capturing per capita expenditures is a  tricky business.  Suppose incomes are 
measured with a large amount of measurement error, then many of those in the top are  
there  merely  due  to  measurement  and  would  be  expected  to  return  with subsequent 
measurement,  irrespective of what happened to their income.  
The second is true transitory shocks to incomes and expenditures.  In addition to 
measurement error, especially in turbulent economic times one would expect many large 
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changes and reversal of fortune.  These “true” shocks would also tend to produce 
regression to the mean.  
The third, is that the shock actually affected those at the top end more than at the bottom 
end of the distribution, as is suggested by the distribution of  education.  
Table 7  Changes in per capita expenditures, by initial quartile of per capita expenditure (PCE) 
Quartile in 1997 
Per capita expenditures 
1997 
Percentage change 
In mean In median 
I 50 120.00% 49.00% 
II 105 41.90% 11.70% 
III 190 -1.60% -18.80% 
IV 680 -54.00% -41.40% 
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.6 
What has happened to absolute poverty?  Absolute poverty depends on what happens in the 
lower (left) tail of the income distribution.  Clearly, given the differences in the mean and 
the median, merely assuming that the distribution of income changed in a distributionally 
neutral way (as many of the poverty estimates have) is untenable.  
Table 8 shows the results of poverty calculations of absolute poverty.  In order to 
calculate the fraction of households that in 1998 were below the level of expenditures that 
implied 11 percent poverty rate in 1997 one needs to deflate 1998 nominal 
expenditures to 1997 “real” terms.  That is,  nominal expenditures rose a large 
amount, but so did prices and hence there must be a deflation to “real” terms.  Given the   
substantial   price   changes   that   happened   this   will   be   problematic,   and, 
unfortunately, which approach is pursued makes a large difference to the resulting poverty 
rate.  
The first two columns use the inflation rate by province calculated from the BPS 
measurement of prices in 44 cities, and hence assume equal inflation in urban and rural 
areas.  In the absence of rural-urban deflators from official sources this is perhaps the 
most natural approach to deflation.  
As can be seen by this approach “absolute poverty” has increased, from 11 percent to 13.8 
percent of the population.  Since there have been widely cited numbers, not based on 
new data, that poverty had increased to 39 percent (BPS) or even 48 percent (ILO) of the 
population it goes without saying this number, which suggests a change in poverty an order of 
magnitude smaller, will raise some controversy
6
.  
However, before dismissing it out of hand,  this poverty calculation can be compared with 
the expenditures data from the “100 villages” survey.  Using that data we pick the 11th 
percentile of the 1997 expenditure data as the poverty line (in other words we simply assume 
11 percent poverty in 1997 for purposes of comparison, the 1997 number is arbitrary).  We 
                                                     
6 Of course, it was known since their publication that these numbers were a massive overstatement of 
the increase in poverty, as they were based on a huge analytical error in their  assumptions  about  
how  inflation  affected  poverty.    It  is  starkest  in  the  ILO publication, which assumed 80 percent 
inflation raised the poverty line by 80 percent, but then assumed that nominal incomes were 
unchanged.  But since every transaction has a buyer and a seller, each expenditure to one person is an 
income to another so the assumption  of 80  percent  inflation  with  unchanged  nominal  
expenditures  is  just untenable.    In  fact  the  data  show  that  nominal  expenditures  did  in  fact  
increase substantially (50-90 percent in table 3) and the only question is the appropriate deflation 
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then deflated 1998 expenditures by the national CPI and calculated the fraction of the 
households under the 1997 poverty line.  By this calculation poverty also only increased to 
14.3 percent.  
Also, while there were dire predictions made about the extent of poverty, other estimates, 
that took into account the possible sectoral allocation of the fall in GDP, were less dire.  For 
instance, in the World Bank’s Indonesia in Crisis the base case predictions of the rise in 
poverty assumed zero growth in agriculture and hence that most of the fall would be in the 
urban sectors (manufacturing, construction).  This meant that the forecast was that poverty 
would rise only by 3 percentage points, squarely in the range of 2.8 to 3.4 percentage point 
increases the actual new data show
7
.  
So the current findings, while dramatically different from some forecasts, are not in fact 
unreasonable given the sectoral and regional composition of the contraction in GDP.  They 
are not some fluke or massive flaw in the data, this is a finding that needs to  be  taken  
seriously,  but  there  are  three  issues  that  need  to  be  taken  into consideration. 
Table 8  Poverty calculations using alternative assumptions about inflation and different 
expenditure data  
 
Deflation by province specific CPI 
from BPS 
IFLS deflation 
1997 1998 1997 1998 
All 11 13.8 11 19.9 
Urban 9.2 12 9.2 15.8 
Rural 12.4 15.2 12.4 23 
     
None 19.1 19.4 
  
Primary 13.6 15.5 
  
Secondary 5.1 10.6 
  
Tertiary 1.6 6.5 
  
“100 villages” expenditure data 
 
With BPS deflation IFLS 
All 11 14.4 11 18.6 
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.1 and Table 2.3 and calculations from “100 villages” data 
First,  the BPS CPI inflation rate.  The IFLS survey also collected price information on 38 
items.  Their inflation rate is 15 percentage points higher than BPS measured inflation 
for the same provinces, and inflation was 5 percent higher in rural than urban areas.  
Obviously for fixed nominal expenditures each increase in inflation lowers real incomes 
and hence will raise poverty.  So under the IFLS assumptions about the inflation rate 
poverty rises from 11 to 19.9 percent.  
However,  it would be no trivial matter to accept that the CPI— besides the exchange rate— 
the  most  tracked  macroeconomic  indicator  had  misstated  inflation  by 15 percentage 
points in one year.  This would have implications for nearly every indicator of economic 
performance. 
                                                     
7 In that report the baseline poverty rate in 1997 was 10.1 and the poverty rate was forecast to  
increase  in 1998  to 14.1 under  the  assumptions  of  a 12  percent  fall  in  GDP concentrated outside 
of agriculture. 
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Second,    these  calculations  are  not  “true”  poverty  calculations  as  they  deflate 
expenditures and then compare with a previous poverty line.  If there had not been massive 
changes in relative prices this would be appropriate.  However, the data show that food 
prices have risen by more than non-food prices.  Since food prices play a much more 
important role in the poverty line than in the CPI it is almost certain that recalculating the 
poverty line (e.g. recalculating the level of expenditures necessary to maintain a “minimal” 
nutritional intake) would raise the poverty line by much more than the rate of inflation.  
Third,  we return to the point that what is measure is expenditures, not incomes, which 
has two important implications.  In the face of massive rises in the prices of stables 
people will raise their expenditures to maintain their consumption, even at the expense of 
reducing consumption on other items.  Hence they will be much worse off than expenditures 
per capita would indicate.  Second, people will use “dissaving” to smooth their consumption 
expenditures in the face of income reductions— especially if those are perceived as 
temporary.  
Both of these factors are illustrated by the dramatic changes in the composition of 
expenditures.  Table 9 shows the changes in expenditure shares between 1997 and 1998 
for the IFLS and the “100 villages” data sets.  Both show a large increase in the share of 
expenditures devoted to food.  In fact, in the 100 villages data the shift is almost 
unbelievably huge.  The IFLS data show that most of the shift has been in “stables” with 
nearly everything else, including other food items, being reduced to accommodate. 
Table 9 Changes in expenditures shares, 1997 to 1998 
 IFLS 100 Villages 
1997 1998 Change 1997 1998 Change 
Food 70 74 4 66.2 75.7 9.5 
Of which:       
Stapes 23.6 31.7 8.1    
Meat 12.7 10 -2.7    
Dairy 3.1 3.1 0    
Oil 2.4 2.7 0.2    
Vegetables 10.5 11.1 0.6    
Non-Food 30 26 -4 33.8 24.3 -9.5 
Of which:       
Alcohol/tobacco 4.3 4.7 0.4    
Health 1.4 1 -0.4    
Education 3.5 2.9 -0.5    
HH goods 5.6 4.7 -0.9    
Transport 2.4 2.2 -0.2    
Clothing 2.5 1.9 -0.6    
Housing 8.2 6.6 -1.5    
Recreation 2.2 1.9 -0.3    
Source:  IFLS 2+ , Table 3.1 and “100 villages” data 
In  evaluating  these  figures  on  expenditures  shares,  keep  in  mind  the  earlier 
mentioned temporary spike in the price of rice.  This would cause a temporary spike in the 
Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit  17 
 
share of stables that my not reflect a long-term trend as the prices declined rapidly in 
October. 
However, of particular concern is that expenditure shares on health and education are being 
reduced, which combined with the reductions in  income imply  reductions in absolute amounts 
being spent on these items.  
E. Implications of the new data 
There are two important questions, should these new findings be trusted?  And second, what 
does this distribution of the shock across individuals mean for poverty rates and the social 
impact of the crisis?  
We don’t really know all we would like to know, and certainly it would be rash to make 
important decisions based only on new quantitative data, but decisions will be made and there is 
a need to act on what information we do have.  How does the existing data square with available 
anecdotal accounts?  
First, the heterogeneity of the crisis suggests that there has been a substantial fall in average or 
typical income, but that is perhaps even more striking is that there has been a huge amount of 
“churning” or changes in who is or is not doing well.  There is an  analogy  with  recent  labor  
market  studies  that  emphasize  that  changes  in aggregates often mask huge underlying 
volatility amongst individuals.  For instance, in industrial countries when the unemployment 
rate increases by one percentage point, from 5 to 6 percent this is not because 1 percent of the 
people lost their jobs.  It is because the differences in the gross flows, which are normally very 
large, changed so that say, of the normal number of people losing jobs increased from 11 
percent to 12 percent and the number of people finding jobs stayed steady at 11 percent.  But the 
gross job creation and destruction is often orders of magnitude larger than the changes in the 
net.  
So to in an economic crisis.  Even though on average expenditures might not have changed 
much this is a combination of some people, which may have doing quite well prior to the crisis 
having done really badly while others staying about the same while still others are booming.  
This level of individual “churning” in well being cannot be ignored as an important part of the 
perceptions of the crisis as it creates uncertainty in everyone’s mind in a way that structural 
poverty does not.  
Second,  the vast expansion in new reports in the media and through other channels on  poverty  
and  suffering  need  to  take  into  account  the  very  changed  political circumstances.  
Whereas before government officials had no incentive to report on poverty, and in fact were 
likely encouraged to understate poverty, the existence of safety net program financing reverses 
those incentives.  In addition, the media were not free in the previous regime and may have been 
directly or indirectly discouraged from  reporting  on  negative  features,  like  the  homeless.    
In  this  case  increased reporting on poverty is a new freedom on reporting.  
Third,  given the regional heterogeneity of the crisis what one reports depends on where one 
reports from.  This crisis is consistent with village level studies that report either complete 
devastation (in villages dependent for employment on a particular factory) or a boom (in 
villages that are export crop oriented).  There is a huge crisis in Jakarta, which is the capital city 
and hence reports from there will tend to reflect the serious and deep crisis there.  But anecdotal 
reports cannot be extrapolated to a general or national picture.  
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Fourth, these reports are consistent with many anecdotal reports from different regions.  Visitors 
to some parts of Indonesia have been reporting since the beginning of the crisis that in some 
areas there were few problems.  So while about areas like Jakarta one hears many crisis 
stories there are also anecdotal reports of rural areas in which local motorcycle dealerships 
are booming.  
Moreover, a recent qualitative study in parts of Central Java by a team of sociologists 
studying the issue qualitatively report that the crisis is not in fact affecting the poor as 
severely as was feared.  In fact, this report suggests the crisis may even be helping them  in  
some  ways,  as  middle  class  consumers  return  to  traditional  markets (dominated by 
informal sellers) from more formal retail channels and return informal services (such as 
repair) that would have been avoided.  
Turning a question as important as reliability,  what are the implications for policy?  
 the data suggest that geographic targeting is a very important part of response to the 
crisis.  If the country were hit equally across all regions then perhaps a 
universal response would be appropriate.  However,  it is clear some areas are (at least 
relatively) booming.  
 disproportional impact on those who were doing well before the crisis means that 
there in general terms little correlation between the pre-crisis poor and near poor, ad 
the social impacts of the crisis.  People who begin from different absolute levels of 
income will have different responses to the crisis.  For instance, middle  families 
will respond to a shock by working more, reducing consumption,  down savings, and 
selling assets, but are unlikely to pull children from primary school or suffer 
malnutrition.  In contrast, people near absolute poverty may not have the luxury of 
these coping strategies so an equally large shock will force them into more drastic 
measures, such as primary school drop-out and reduced food intake.  
 the lack of correlation between those suffering from the crisis at every level (urban 
versus  rural,  across  provinces,  and  across  individuals)  raises  important and 
difficult questions in program design whether one is targeting to poverty or is 
targeting to crisis suffering.  
 The type of programmatic response needs to be sensitive to the origin of the shock in a 
particular locality.  Therefore, if the cause is a draught and the impact is affecting 
peasant  farmers  food  for  work  programs  are  a  possibly  appropriate response. 
However, if the crisis is that former urban bank clerks with a high school 
education or higher are unemployed due to a banking crisis, it is not clear that relief 
type programs will be effective. 
III. Employment 
A. Forecast 
In early October, 1998 the Manpower Minister stated that one in five Indonesian’s was 
currently unemployed and that this would rise to 20 million people (22 percent of the 
workforce) by the end of the year
8
. However, these type of forecasts, as well as earlier 
unemployment   numbers   of 15   percent   were   extrapolated   from   simple 
GDP/employment elasticity models and not from real data.  
                                                     
8 The Indonesia Observer, Oct. 9, 1998 
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These unemployment figures clearly do not hold up under analytical scrutiny.  For one, 
relationships between output growth and employment developed as the economy grows are a 
poor indicator of what will happen to employment when output drops. Employment/output 
“elasticities” focus on the demand for labor, but say little about supply.  
In fact, it is unlikely there will be widespread "unemployment" when wages are flexible 
downwards and households do not have sufficient savings or safety net support.  That is,  the 
effect one would expect to see from a contraction in labor demand in an economy like 
Indonesia is not “structural unemployment” of the type seen in Europe, but rather falls in 
real wages and increases in employment rates and labor hours as families try and 
maintain their real necessary expenditures. The absolutely poor cannot afford to be 
“unemployed.”  
The data bear this out.  What is happening is an increase of the fraction of the labor force 
employed and little or no rise in open unemployment.  What is happening is that household 
members are working more, and perhaps longer hours, working for lower wages, and there 
has been a massive shifts in the sectoral composition of employment growth with formal 
sectors like construction, manufacturing and finance contracting while informal sectors (self-
employment, trade) are expanding.  
B. New Unemployment and Employment data  
The shortcomings of the Ministry's unemployment projections were elaborated in a  
June 1998 ILO report which put forward its own lower unemployment estimates. The  
report, "Employment Challenges of the Indonesia Economic Crisis", explained that  
"because many cannot afford  to remain unemployed for long, around half of the  
workers displaced by the crisis will be absorbed in the informal sector." (p. 28)  The study 
estimates that open unemployment would rise from 5 percent in mid-1997 (precrisis) to 7 
percent in mid-1998.  And that the problem will be one mainly of educated job seekers in the 
towns and cities.  ILO's lower estimates are closer to findings of the new data sources.  
SUSENAS.  Initial results of the SUSENAS survey conducted in February 1998 show  
that employment increased in February 1998 by 4.5 million from a year earlier -- with  
almost all the new jobs in agriculture.  Applying the GDP/employment elasticity  
model -- correlating unemployment to reduced output would instead suggest reduced  
employment  of 11.5  million! These  same  SUSENAS  data  show  that  open 
unemployment rose from 5.1 percent in February 1997 to 6.4 percent in February  
1998, as compared to 15.1 percent projected by the model.   Impact of the crisis on  
participation in the labor market is shown in Table 10 where the first rows show data from 
SUSENAS in Feb 1998 shows total employment rates among the population aged ten and 
above rising 1 percent, from 56 to 57 percent of the population. 
Table 10 Employment rates of the population aged 10 and above 
 
1994 1997 1998 Change, ’97 to 98 
Total 57.6 56.3 57.4 1.1 
Urban 50.4 50.5 52.2 1.7 
Rural 61.5 59.4 60.2 0.8 
Source : SUSENAS 
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100 villages.  The data from the 100 village study show employment rates of the labor force 
and employment rates in non-agricultural activities and an indicator of open unemployment.  
Open unemployment in this sample is recorded at 1.6 percent of the population,  the  main  
informational  value  of  which  is  that  this  indicator  is  a completely worthless indicator of 
the state of the labor market.  
The labor force participation of the population aged 10 and above has fallen by less than a 
percentage point (-.7).  This is a combination of a fall in employment of men and a slight rise 
for women. 
Table 11 Employment and unemployment rates  by gender 
 
1997 1998 Change 
Open unemployment 
Total 1.5 1.6 0 
Employed (bekerja) 
Total 57.5 56.9 -0.7 
Males 74.2 72.4 -1.8 
Females 40.5 40.8 0.3 
Work more than 35 hours 
Total 49.4 56.9 7.5 
Males 58.8 64.5 5.8 
Females 31.9 42.9 11 
Source:  100 villages survey, various tables 
What is perhaps somewhat more surprising is that those reporting working more than 35 hours 
a week has also increased, by a considerable amount.  
IFLS 2+.  The IFLS2+ has slightly different data on employment in that it breaks This data 
indicates that participation in the labor force (measured as those that earned income in 
the previous year) for both males and females at younger age (15-24) has increased 
substantially. On the other hand, older men and women have experienced a significant 
decline in labor market participation 
Table 12 Labor force participation (earned income in the year) 
Age group 1997 1998 
Change  
1997 to 1998 
Males 
15-24 35.3 41.2 5.9 
25-34 89.5 88.6 -0.9 
35-44 96.3 91.8 -4.5 
45-54 93.4 89.4 -4 
55-64 83.6 73.8 -9.8 
65+ 61.3 56.8 -4.5 
Females 
15-24 21.9 25.4 3.5 
25-34 39.1 38.6 -0.5 
35-44 46.8 48.9 2.1 
45-54 45.2 45.5 0.3 
55-64 36.4 35.7 -0.7 
65+ 28.3 26.9 -1.4 
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Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 4.1 
C. Sectoral and Regional Shifts in Employment  
SUSENAS.  The new data from the census show huge shifts in the composition of employment 
between rural and urban, and between “formal” and “informal” sectors. For instance,  
employment in industry fell 13 percent, in Finance 7.3 percent, in electricity 27 percent, in 
construction 2.6 percent.  However,  some of these sectors are relatively small parts of the labor 
force.  So for instance,  although employment in finance declined 7.3 percent, since it was only 
.7 percent of the labor force this only reduced jobs in that sector by .1 percent of the total labor 
force.  Agriculture more than expanded to pick up the slack. 
Table 13 Sectoral composition of the labor force,  comparing February 1997 with February 
1998 
  
Sector: 
1997 1998 Percentage 
change 
  
 Change are 
percent of 1997 
labor force 
Number 
(‘000) 
Percent 
Number 
(‘000) 
Percent 
Agriculture 36,711.7 44.50% 42,279.1 48.60% 15.20% 6.80% 
Mining 737.8 0.90% 805.1 0.90% 9.10% 0.10% 
Industry 9,418.4 11.40% 8,191.2 9.40% -13.00% -1.50% 
Electricity 348.6 0.40% 254.1 0.30% -27.10% -0.10% 
Constructio 3,963.4 4.80% 3,606.5 4.10% -9.00% -0.40% 
Trade 14,613.5 17.70% 15,032.0 17.30% 2.90% 0.50% 
Transport 3,835.1 4.60% 3,734.6 4.30% -2.60% -0.10% 
Finance 696.0 0.80% 645.2 0.70% -7.30% -0.10% 
Services 12,153.7 14.70% 12,449.9 14.30% 2.40% 0.40% 
  82,478.2 100.00% 86,997.7 100.00% 5.50% 5.50% 
Source:  SUSENAS, Table 2a 
In terms of the “formality” of the employment there is no explicit data.  But table 14 shows the 
distribution of employment  by category.  It shows that employment as “employees” declined by 
roughly 2 percent of the labor force  and that what caused the increase in the labor force was 
“self-employed” workers in urban and rural areas and an increase in “family” workers in rural 
areas.  This is reflects the sectoral shift above. 
Table 14 Distribution of the labor force by type of employment 
 
Urban Rural 
Share of 
1997 labor 
force 
Percentage  
Growth 
Growth as 
% of labor 
force 
Share of 
1997 labor 
force 
Percentage  
Growth 
Growth as 
% of labor 
force 
Self-employed (Berusaha 
sendiri) 
6.60% 25.50% 1.70% 13.30% 25.40% 3.40% 
Self-employed with 
workers (Berusaha dibantu 
buruh) 
5.30% -13.10% -0.70% 20.00% 4.60% 0.90% 
Employer/Employee 
(Buruh/Karyawan) 
18.80% -4.90% -0.90% 16.60% -6.00% -1.00% 
Unpaid family workers 
(Pekerja tak dibayar) 
2.70% -2.30% -0.10% 16.70% 13.10% 2.20% 
Total 33.40% 0.00% 0.00% 66.60% 8.20% 5.50% 
Source: SUSENAS 
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D. Wages, Real and Otherwise 
Individual survey variables in the Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey show an increase in nominal 
wages.  More than 85% of the mantri tani reported that wages had increased for hoeing.  
Responses also indicate that there has been a less dramatic increase in harvesting wages
9
. These 
imply that while assumption of no change in nominal income are far off the mark
10
, given of the 
data about price changes suggest there have been substantial real wages declines in many areas. 
However, on the revenue side, there has been an intermediate increase in non-rice output prices. 
Mantri tani responses also point to some increase in farm profitability (more than 50% answered 
that farm profits had increased compared to last year, although the mean response was no 
change), indicating that increases in output prices have outweighed rising labor costs in some 
areas.  
The one set of data that do not jibe with this story (either in terms of regional patterns or the 
magnitude of the shock) are the rural wage data.  BPS collects data on agricultural wages, which 
many people suspect for a variety of reasons (e.g. small samples, reports on “typical” wages no 
actual).  These data show large falls in real wages for unskilled agricultural wages.  National 
CPI inflation has been 81 percent between December and August.  This would imply real wage 
losses between 30 and 40  percent  in  most  provinces.    This  is  certainly  appears  
inconsistent  with  the evolution of expenditures, especially among HH headed by an unskilled 
worker,  but perhaps the expenditure data are reflecting more HH members working and higher 
work hours.  
The regional pattern does no seem to be consistent with either the Kecamatan or IFLS data,  
with  smaller  wage  increases  in  East  Java  for  instance,  than  in  parts  of Sumatera and 
Sulawesi. 
  
                                                     
9 Data from BPS indicate that agricultural wages have increased 30-35% on average for 
different tasks, with increases ranging from 10 to 50% in different provinces 
10 One recent publication for instance, placed the numbers in poverty in Indonesia at 
nearing 100 million in 1998, which essentially assumed that nominal incomes would 
remain unchanged while prices climbed 80 percent.  This is obviously both analytically 
unsound and empirically false 
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Table 15 Daily nominal wages in various agricultural tasks (hoeing, weeding, planting),  
December and August 1998. 
 
% change 
Dec-97 Aug-98 
Avg. of 3 agricultural tasks 
West Sumatra 21.08% 3091 3742 
West Java 21.25% 3517 4264 
Central Java 21.36% 2370 2876 
South Kalimantan 24.31% 4044 5028 
Lampung 24.59% 2256 2811 
South Sumatra 26.16% 2404 3033 
DI Yogya 26.91% 1333 1691 
North Sumatra 29.89% 3349 4350 
South Sulawesi 29.93% 2597 3374 
East Java 32.80% 3428 4553 
NTB 35.23% 3004 4062 
Bali 38.71% 3940 5465 
DI Aceh 54.47% 3021 4666 
North  Sulawesi 61.11% 4703 7577 
Source: BPS, various publications 
E. Implications for Employment Creation Program Design  
In an economy like Indonesia “unemployment” is not the right lens to see the problem with 
collapsing labor demand, rather the focus should be on real wages, particularly the wage for 
unskilled labor and on total earnings of households.  
Imagine two types of economies, one with perfectly fixed wages and one with perfectly flexible 
wages.  In the economy with fixed wages a collapse in labor demand will mean workers will be 
laid off and will be unable to bid down the wage and hence will want to work at the going wage, 
but will be unable to do so.  In this sense “unemployment” is a disequilibrium phenomena.  In 
this case the brunt of unemployment will fall on those that are laid off.  Many workers will 
continue to work at the same wage as ever while the earnings of those with no job will be zero 
so the suffering is born exclusively by those particular individuals who are unemployed.  In this 
case the policy response to identify those individuals and raise their incomes.  
In  contrast  in  a  market  with  flexible  labor  markets  (e.g.  few  hiring  and  firing 
restrictions) and flexible wages  (particularly real wages in an inflationary period) 
“unemployment” is not the problem but falling wages will be.  That is, laid off workers will be 
able to bid down the wages of other workers such that everyone who wants to work at the going 
wage will be able to find employment.  But,  it may well be that the wage falls to very low 
levels.  Especially in such an economy with little or no social security, large scale 
“unemployment” is just not feasible, people must work to survive and the informal market 
absorbs the additional labor shed from the formal sector, but at lower and lower earnings.  
And that is what the emerging data say.  Employment rates, the proportion of the population in 
the paid labor force, are up.  Unemployment rates are up only slightly. But this is not necessarily 
a good sign as working more is a coping mechanism as households are having more people 
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work longer hours for less pay as a way of maintaining their incomes.  The issue is sustaining 
the earnings of the poorest, not preventing lay-offs or providing “unemployment” insurance.  
This implies that employment creation programs need not be targeted to specific individuals (as 
all are bearing the costs of reduced wages) but should be targeted to areas with depressed 
demand for labor.  
Furthermore,  this suggests that it is not desirable or possible to target employment programs 
based on data about “unemployment.”  
IV. Education  
A. Forecast 
There were also widely repeated forecast was that enrollment rate of school aged children would 
fall from 78 to 54 percent.  This implies that one of five school aged children would with drop-
out of school.  
Now while this was often repeated as fact or a reliable forecast, the estimate was given as a 
guess of one official of what might happen if the crisis were severe and if nothing were  done.    
Fortunately in  this  case  something  was  done,  the  Bank  and  ADB supported a government 
launched a nationwide “Stay in School” campaign with an information program, scholarships to 
poor children in junior secondary school, and grants to schools to make up for lost revenue.  
What exact impact those programs had is hard to say, but it is clear that enrollment has not in 
fact fallen by anywhere near the amount feared.  
There have been falls in enrollment, but nothing like the feared 24 percentage points, more like 
4-5 percentage points.  But this is no cause for complacency as any reversal in  the  schooling  
of  children  is  a  potentially  irreversible  waste  that  cannot  be condoned.  Moreover, the 
experience with the previous macroeconomic crisis was that the losses in enrollments began in 
the years after the crisis.  
B. Primary versus secondary 
In addition to the three sources above there is also a recent survey of schools themselves, 
tracking enrollments in schools over the last four or five years.  
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey:  The kecamatan survey asked only abut primary school.  
Nearly all respondents indicated that taking children out of primary school was not a common 
response to crisis impacts
11
.  This result is further reinforced by the responses given by the 
school supervisors to the sector specific questions -almost 85% indicated that there had been no 
change or a reduction in the number of students that dropped out between Grade 3 and 4
12
.  On 
average, school supervisors also indicated no change in the overall level of dropouts during the 
last school year (compared to the preceding year) or in the numbers of girls and boys that 
entered Grade 1 this school year (compared to last year).  
                                                     
11 The common question did not differentiate between primary or secondary school students 
12 Historically, dropout rates at the primary level are highest between these two grades. There was no 
difference in responses for girls or boys.  Other data sources indicate the problem with drop out is at 
the junior secondary level and hence our data has little to contribute on this issue. 
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However, for the latter there is some indication that in some areas there is a decrease in first-
year enrollment rates, indicating that parents may be delaying school starts for younger children 
while letting older children continue.  
100 Villages data.  Table 16 shows the enrollment rates for ages 7-12 and 13-15 from the 100 
villages data comparing 1994, 1997 and 1998.  Strangely,  the data indicate that there has been a 
substantial increase in the school enrollment rates of primary school aged children for both boys 
and girls  
Table 16 Enrollment rates  at primary (7-12) and secondary (13-15) school ages 
Age Gender 1994 1997 1998 
Change (percentage points) 
1997 to 1998 1994 to 1998 
Aged 7-12 
Males 88.8 88.8 92.1 3.2 3.3 
Females 90.4 90.8 93.3 2.5 2.9 
Aged 13-19 
Males 59.4 67.5 65.2 -2.3 5.8 
Females 58.4 70.6 65.2 -5.4 6.8 
Source:  100 villages data, Table 06.A and Table 06.B 
However, when we look at the 13-15 age group in the 100 villages data, school enrollment 
between 1997/98 and 1998/99 school years decreased by 3.3 percentage points in the 100 
villages, with the fall substantially larger for girls than for boys. Interestingly, this still leaves 
enrollment rates in 1998 well above their levels in 1994.  
IFLS 2+ data.  The IFLS 2+ data has slightly different age breakdowns.  They show do not 
break down into primary and secondary enrollment rates but divide children 7-12 year olds 
(essentially primary and lower secondary) and from youth and young adults 13-19 year olds 
(junior, upper secondary and beyond).  For children enrollment rates declined by 1.1 percentage 
for boys and 2.8 percentage points for girls (but note that the absolute level is now equal for 
boys and girls).  This suggests larger changes at this level than found in either the 100 villages 
(which suggested increases) or school survey below (which suggests no crisis induced change). 
Table 17 Changes in enrollment rates  by age groups and male-female 
 
1997 1998 
Change (percentage 
points) 
Aged 7-12 Males 94.9 93.8 -1.1 
Females 96.6 93.8 -2.8 
Aged 13-19 Males 61.6 56.8 -4.8 
Females 59.4 55.7 -3.7 
Source: IFLS2+, Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 
The IFLS 2+ shows dramatic decreases in enrollments among youth and young adults.  
Enrollment rates dropped by 4.8 percentage points for males and 3.7 percentage points for 
females.  
Educational survey.  An additional source on education enrollment comes from a 
recently  completely  survey  of  schools,  which  examined  the  enrollments  for 
600schools for the past five enrollment years. This data compares enrollment changes 
across years, with a focus on the most recent  change from 1997/98 to 1998/99 school 
year where one would expect the “crisis impact”.  
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Figure 3 Percentage change in the number of students enrolled 
 
Overall enrollments at the primary level fell by 1.5 percent in 1998/99 (“crisis impact” year), 
but do not appear to be deviating from their past trend (Figure 3).  Enrollments fell by similar, 
or even larger amounts in each of the three previous school years. Keep in mind that decreases 
in enrollments by school are consistent with rising enrollment rates of school aged children if 
either age cohorts are smaller due to falling population growth rates or with additional school 
construction.  
There is some indication of increasing late enrollment at the primary level that suggests trouble 
down the road.  
Overall at the junior secondary level there has been a decline in the number of students enrolled 
in the crisis year by 2.3 percent.  This, is in contrast with primary school, is a much larger 
decrease than in previous years.  However, it is a little puzzling that the “change in the 
change” that is the decrease in the rates of growth  
precedes the crisis and that there was a decline of 1.2 percent the year before the  
crisis.  
Summary:  Primary versus Secondary.  All of the data sources are consistent that the fall 
in enrollments is much larger at the secondary level than at the primary level.  In fact, there 
appears to be either no decrease or a slight increase in enrollment rates at the primary 
level.  There is a note of concern about increasing late enrollment of children, but 
difficult to assess the magnitude of that problem.  
But,  it has always been well known that the major problem with enrollment rates in 
Indonesia is the sharp fall off in enrollments as children, especially poor children, do not 
make the transition from primary to lower secondary school.  In this sense it is not 
surprising that the observed response to the crisis is drop-outs at the junior secondary 
and higher, not the primary level.  
C. Rural versus Urban and Regional Pattern 
The various data sources are spotty in their coverage of rural-urban and regions.  We focus 
first on the rural versus urban breakdown from the educational survey and then piece 
together information on the geographic distribution from the 100 villages and Kecamatan 
crisis impact survey.  
Education survey data: Rural versus urban.  The education survey gives the best 
information on the urban rural breakdown of changes in enrollment.  There is no clear 
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pattern in the data for primary schools.  But for junior secondary schools there are two clear 
patterns, one which is quite puzzling.  
First,    there  have  been  substantial  reductions  in  enrollments  in  urban  junior 
secondary schools.  Moreover, as can be seen from table 18 enrollments fell in urban areas 
about six percent in the crisis year.  Moreover, the crisis is even more evident in Jakarta than 
elsewhere, with junior secondary enrollments falling 8.6 percent (Table 20).  
Of course, since this is school based (not household) data the declines in urban areas and 
relative stability in rural areas could be driven either by declines in urban populations 
of children or households migrate back to rural areas or by declines in enrollment rates 
among school aged children in urban areas. 
Figure 4 Percentage change in the number of students enrolled in rural and urban areas 
 
Second,  and this is puzzling part,  the decreases in the growth rate of enrollments seems to have 
happened the year before  the crisis.  That is, while enrollments grew in rural areas at 4.5 
percent from school year 95/96 to 96/97 this was already a decrease in growth from the previous 
year of 5.6 percent growth.  What is very puzzling is that while in the crisis year enrollment 
rates fell 6.2 percent, they also fell 6.2 percent in the previous year.  Moreover, the growth rate 
declined by more (3.4 and 3.5 percentage points) in the two previous years than in the most 
recent, crisis year.  
Table 18 Changes in enrollments in sampled junior secondary schools, by rural, urban and 
Jakarta 
 
Rural 
Urban (Including 
Jakarta) 
Jakarta 
Growth in 
Enrollment 
(percent) 
Change in 
growth in 
enrollment 
Growth in 
Enrollment 
(percent) 
Change in 
growth in 
enrollment 
Growth in 
Enrollment 
(percent) 
Change in 
growth in 
enrollment 
1994/95 to 
1995/96 
5.6 
 
0.7 
 
-0.8 
 
1995/96 to 
1996/97 
4.5 -1.1 -2.7 -3.4 -4.5 -3.7 
1996/97 to 
1997/98 
1 -3.5 -6.2 -3.5 -5.1 -0.6 
1997/98 to 
1998/99* 
-0.6 -1.6 -6.2 0 -8.6 -3.5 
Source: Education Survey 
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IFLS 2+ data.  The IFLS 2+ data has similar patterns. Enrollment rates for youth and  
young adults 13-19 year olds (junior, upper secondary and beyond) dropped by 5 
percentage points in urban areas, while it is only declined by 1.1 percentage for rural 
Table 19 Changes in enrollment children 13-19 years by rural and urban 
 
1997 1998 Change 
Urban 66.9 61.9 -5 
Rural 53.9 52.9 -1.1 
Source: IFLS2+, Table 5.2 
Regional Patterns  
Education Survey data. The data from the educational survey can be broken down into 
provinces and rural/urban regions, but doing so produces quite small samples of schools  and  
hence  the  results  need  to  be  taken  with  a  great  deal  of  caution. Nevertheless,  the  
provincial  and  urban/rural  desegregation  suggests  a  common pattern, that some areas are 
doing relatively well (e.g. rural areas of South Sulawesi, rural Maluku) while others, particularly 
urban areas like Jakarta are doing badly. 
Table 20 Data from education survey by region and rural urban 
  Rural Urban 
South Sulawesi Number of Schools 12 10 
96/97 to 97/98 -1.5 -7.7 
97/98 to 98/99 8.1 -3.4 
Maluku Number of Schools 11 8 
96/97 to 97/98 -1.6 -0.1 
97/98 to 98/99 -0.7 -5.7 
North Sumatra Number of Schools 13 11 
96/97 to 97/98 0.9 -7.7 
97/98 to 98/99 -2.4 -2.3 
Central Java Number of Schools 15 9 
96/97 to 97/98 2.1 -7.5 
97/98 to 98/99 -0.4 -6 
Jakarta Number of Schools  32 
96/97 to 97/98  -5.1 
97/98 to 98/99  -8.6 
Source: Education survey 
100  villages.    The  100  villages  data  only  divides  into  the  three  regions,  but 
nevertheless it is interesting to see that the major falls in enrollment rates in the 13-15 age group 
are happening in Java-Bali, then the “eastern” part, with a very small decrease recorded in the 
“western” islands. 
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Table 21 Enrollment  rates  of  children  aged 13-15,  by region 
 
1994 1997 1998 
Change 
1997-1998 1994-1998 
Java-Bali 53.44 65.93 59.55 -6.38 6.11 
Off J-B-West* 58.64 68.79 67.99 -0.8 9.35 
Off J-B-East** 67.13 73.24 70.9 -2.34 3.77 
Note: *Off Java-West: Riau, Lampung, **Off  Java-East:  East  Nusa  Tenggara (NTT),  East  Kalimantan,  SE 
Sulawesi 
Source:  100 village survey 
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey.  The map in Figure  5shows the distribution of the 
index   of   the   severity   of   primary   school   drop-out   across   regions   across 
kabupaten/kotamadya.  Remember that on average drop out at the primary level in this 
survey was typically not a very severe problem so the variation across the categories 
between most and least hit is perhaps not as severe.  Nevertheless, the distribution does 
appear consistent with the other regional data sets are showing. Areas (especially rural) 
areas in South Sulawesi, Sumatra (except for North) and Maluku are doing relatively well 
while the Eastern Islands,  North Sumatra, and parts of Java (especially Central and West) 
and the cities are faring badly.  
D. New data :  Rich versus Poor 
IFLS 2+.  The IFLS is the only source that can show a relationship between the level of 
household expenditures and the change in the enrollment rates.  The household 
enrollment rates are shown by their 1997 (pre-crisis) level of household per capita 
expenditures.  For children aged 7-12 the data shows an 4.9 percentage point fall in 
enrollment for bottom quartile compared to no change or slight decreases for other 
expenditure groups.  
For youths and young adults the results are different, in that the fall in percentage points 
is nearly the same for the bottom two quartile groups, 5.1 and 5.5 percentage points with 
much smaller falls for the higher quartiles.  The percentage fall does follow in the 
income pattern closely.  
Table 22 Change in enrollment rates by income group 
Quartile by HH 
per capita 
Children Ages 7-12 Youths and young adults, ages 13-19 
1997 1998 
change 
97 to 98 
1997 1998 
change 97 to 98 
Percentage 
point 
% change 
I 93.1 88.2 -4.9 51.5 46.4 -5.1 -9.90% 
II 96.3 96.8 0.5 64 58.5 -5.5 -8.60% 
III 97 95 -2 62.1 61.1 -1 -1.60% 
IV 98.4 98.4 0 66.9 64.6 -2.3 -3.40% 
Source:  IFLS 2+, Tables 5.1. and Table 5.2. 
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Reconciling these results suggesting that the falls in enrollments were the lowest 
amongst the rich with the results above that the greatest proportional losses in income 
came from the higher groups raises two important points about interpreting various 
indicators of the crisis.  
 
First, particularly for indicators that are discrete (e.g. enrolled or not enrolled in 
school, eat two meals or more than two meals) there may be absolute thresholds. 
Suppose all families with income greater than a certain, quite low, level eat three meals 
a day while those below eat three meals a day.  Then even a large shock to the rich will not 
Social Monitoring and Early Response Unit  31 
 
show itself in an indicator that relies on eating a certain number of meals as they will 
absorb relatively large declines in their incomes before ceasing to eat three meals a day.  
Similarly with schooling, the rich will absorb large income losses and cope through other 
mechanisms before undertaking a desperate and irreversible action like withdrawing their 
children from school.  In contrast, many of the poor may already be near the threshold and 
hence even a moderate shock may push them over the edge
13
.  
This means that one cannot use an indicator such as a change in enrollment as a proxy 
for the general impact of the crisis as it will depend both on the magnitude of the shock 
and the pre-existing level of income.  
The second point is slightly more subtle, and has to do with the possibility of 
asymmetric responses to shocks and the impact of changes versus “churning.”  That is, 
suppose that enrollment and drop-out decisions are more or less irreversible.  
Furthermore, suppose that the drop-out decision is influenced by current income (in 
addition  to  lifetime  income  and  future  expectations).    Now  suppose  that  some 
households income increases while other households income decreases, but with no 
change in average income.  It still will be the case that this churning will produce 
declines in enrollments, as the 16 year old who dropped out two years ago when his family 
was poorer is less likely to reenroll in school due to a positive income shock than the 16 
year old is likely to drop-out when his family faces a negative shock.  This asymmetry will 
mean that increased levels of churning of household income can lead to large changes in 
some indicators (like enrollments) even if the average or typical income does not change.  
E. Implications for Response Program Design 
The  relatively  small,  and  regionally  concentrated,  declines  in  enrollments  are 
consistent with the varied nature of the crisis.  Clearly if the shock fell primarily on the  
rich  then  one  would  not  expect  falls  in  primary  or  even  lower  secondary 
enrollments as even large falls in income would not bring these households to a 
threshold of withdrawing their children from school.  
Hopefully at least some small part of the smaller magnitude of these declines than  
what was forecast is also a reflection of the success of the Bank/ADB "stay in school" 
campaign,  even  though  the  actual  scholarships  had  not  in  many  cases  been 
disbursed by the time this data was collected.  However, there is no evidence yet on 
program impact. 
The emerging data suggest that the strategy pursued so  of scholarships and block grants 
is likely the right strategy.  The fact that the losses are the largest amongst the poor and at 
the junior secondary and secondary school levels, suggesting that a strengthening  of  
the  campaign  to  retain  students  in  school  through  targeted scholarships can be 
effective.  However, the targeting of the program is a major issue, as it currently is targeted 
based on essentially “pre-crisis” poverty information (as that was all that was available) but 
needs to be sure it is also reaching new crisis areas like poorer sections of hard hit urban 
areas.  
                                                     
13 This is obvious in a technical sense from any non-linear model predicting a binary outcome (such as 
probit or logit regressions).  The marginal impact of a given change depends not only on the 
magnitude of the change but also on where in the distribution function the change is evaluated 
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V. Health and nutrition 
Summarizing health and nutrition status is complex as there are a variety of different  
indicators of health (self reported morbidity, visits the medical practioners, reports on  
specific  disease  conditions,  etc.)  and  of  nutrition (weight  for  age,  birth  weight, 
deficiencies in specific nutrients, etc.) and we do not have space to do it justice here.  
At this stage we will make only two observations.  First, that a collection of health and 
nutrition indicators from the IFLS 2+ and from SUSENAS ’98 show how complex it will 
be to investigate impacts.  Overall these data are not inconsistent with the evidence 
above of a complex and heterogeneous crisis, with pockets of serious health impacts.  
Second, there is clear evidence of a cutback in visitation rates to public clinics, but how 
exactly the interpret that is far from clear.  
Indicators of health and nutrition  
Table 23. derive from the IFLS 2+ data, shows a mix of indicators with a variety of 
patterns.  Overall there are some indicators that show improvement, others that show 
worsening,  but overall the changes are small in either direction 
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Table 23 Variety of indicators of health and nutritional status 
 
The data from the 1998 SUSENAS (collected relatively early in the crisis) shows some changes 
in self-reported morbidity.  
Table 24 Self reported morbidity in SUSENAS 
Source of Income Morbidity Disruptive Morbidity 
1995 1998 Change 1995 1998 Change 
Indonesia 25.4 25.5 0.1 9.6 10.6 1 
Financial services 21.9 25.1 3.2 6.4 9.2 2.8 
Construction 24.8 26.5 1.7 9.5 11.2 1.7 
Source: SUSENAS 
The other data sources, such as the “100 villages” and other specific nutritional data  
show similar complex patterns, with some indicators improving and others worsening. Given 
the complex and regionally heterogeneous nature of the crisis itself, this is not surprising.  
One additional point the data agree on is that usage of public clinics has declined.  In the 
IFLS 2+ data the usage of publicly run health services declined by 1.8 percentage points 
 
1997 1998 Change 
Nutrition 
Height for age 
(% of children under 9 with z score <-2) 
50.68 45.66 
-5.02 
(improvement) 
 
Weight for height 
(% of children under 9 with z score <-1) 
35.56 35.2 
-0.36 
(improvement) 
 
Body mass index of adults 
(% of population with kg/meter squared<18) 
14.05 14.69 
0.63 
(worsening) 
Inadequate Hemoglobin 
(percent with level less than 12 mg/dl) 
34.75 30.83 
-1.66 
(improvement) 
Evaluated health status 
Number of seconds to move from 
sitting to standing 5 times 
7.6 5.9 
-1.64 
(improvement) 
Overall evaluation of health status by 
nurse 
5.94 5.98 
0.04 
(slight improvement) 
Self reported health status 
% reporting themselves in poor health: 
adults 
13.64 13.83 
0.19 
(slight worsening) 
% reporting their children in poor 
health 
6.96 8.3 
1.34 
(worsening) 
% reporting that they had been ill 
(slight worsening) 
21.01 21.95 0.92 
% reporting their children had been ill 
(slight improvement) 
25.56 24.76 -0.8 
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among adults and by a huge 7.1 percentage points among children.  SUSENAS data 
comparing 1998 with 1995 (not 1997) show similar declines concentrated among public 
services.  The concentration among public services raises the question as to whether 
these declines are driven by falling incomes and reduced ability to pay (in which case one 
would  perhaps expect to see declines in the private services and a shift to public 
services).  An alternative is that the budget cuts affected the perceived quality of the public 
clinics almost immediately (e.g. reduced inventories of drugs) or a pass through in public 
clinics of costs and hence the decline in demand is due to these factors specific to the 
public sector.  
Table 25 Use of health services, particularly public health services 
  1997 1998 Change 
% of Adults using any services 14.4 13.3 -1.1 
% of Adults using any public services 7.2 5.4 -1.8 
% of children using any services 25.8 19.9 -5.9 
% of children using public services 20.3 13.2 -7.1 
SUSENAS data on contact rates in the population    
Total 14.6 12.1 -2.5 
Private 7 6.5 -0.5 
Public 7.6 5.6 -2 
of which:  Health centers 6.4 4.5 -1.8 
Source: SUSENAS 
VI. Conclusion 
Many reports on the crisis in Indonesia suggest that the impact has been universal and 
devastating, severely affecting  rural and urban, poor and rich, modern and traditional  
sectors,  and  almost  every  region.    The  BPS  has  reported  that  the percentage of 
people living below the poverty line in mid-1998 was around 40 percent or about 80 million 
people: an increase in the poverty rate of almost 30 percentage points in a year. In early 
October, 1998 the Manpower Minister stated that one in five Indonesian’s was currently 
unemployed and that this would rise to 20 million people  (22 percent of the workforce) by 
the end of the year
14
. There were also widely repeated forecast was that enrollment rate of 
school aged children would fall from 78 to 54 percent.  This implies that one of five 
school aged children would with drop-out of school. Those reports have motivated of new 
survey to assess the impact of the crisis on many faces of the Indonesian economy.  
Preliminary findings suggest that, indeed, the Indonesian crisis has affected the life of many 
Indonesians.  There is no doubt one of the most serious crisis that Indonesia has faced in 
30 years.  However, the impact has been very heterogeneous and has been less dramatic 
than early predictions suggested.  While many households are enduring difficult shocks, 
other are benefiting.   Particularly,  each of the numbers cited above are off, by roughly an 
order of magnitude.  
The finding has potential implications in the allocation of resources, and the need for regular 
monitoring efforts for better targeting.  
                                                     
14 The Indonesia Observer, Oct. 9, 1998 
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Designing specific programs that respond to the crisis is complicated and must 
balance several objectives, but this data at least suggest that crisis response efforts should 
target those areas with the relatively largest drops in welfare levels It is important to note 
that the magnitude of crisis impacts does not correlate with pre-crisis levels of poverty.  
This result points to the need to reassess data and assumptions about poverty 
distributions.  While difficult to draw in practice, there is a analytical distinction between 
targeting for the critical targeting long term poverty programs.  In designing longer term 
poverty interventions there is a deeper, and resolved, question of whether the crisis has 
changed fundamental dynamics and hence calls for a rethinking of long-term poverty 
programs or is merely a temporary shock.  
In terms of the kinds of interventions that should be designed for the crisis this 
requires more detailed analysis of the cost-effectiveness in practice of various types of 
interventions.  But there appears a need for continued efforts to channel rice and other 
basic foods to needy areas, workfare programs, especially in urban areas, efforts to maintain 
health services, and continuation of the scholarship program 
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